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Introduction
Natural Gas and InterNorth merged to create Enron, one of the leading companies in the
energy commodities sector of the economy. After a few short months, there were over 21,000
employees and revenues soared over $101 million. Although Enron became an innovative
company quickly, it expanded into new and unfamiliar markets. The employees of this rapidly
growing company lacked experience in the new markets and were ill prepared when it came to
handling the fast pace at which Enron operated. Management ignored the risks associated with
such rapid expansion and continued to conduct business. To adhere to normal financial reporting
standards, Enron hired the well-known accounting firm, Arthur Andersen. Within months, Enron
collapsed. How can such a powerful and successful company fail so suddenly and drastically?
What exactly happened that destroyed such a large and wealthy company within such a short
period of time?
The collapse of Enron is a well-known story that is often associated with the idea of
accounting fraud and inappropriate financial reporting practices. There are other companies
which have experienced failures similar to Enron’s and one example is WorldCom. WorldCom
was the second-largest telephone company prior to declaring bankruptcy. WorldCom’s
accounting fraud existed within the assets of their balance sheet. WorldCom listed $103.8 billion
in assets as of March 31st 2001, yet the company lacked sufficient funds to pay back the $5.75
billion in bonds and long term debt that was due in the next year (Young and Mollenkamp).
These accounting scandals, as well as others, prompted the government to question the
credibility and accuracy of financial statements across the nation. The government took legal
action in regards to minimizing fraud on the financial statements that a company produces.
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Legal action was proposed in Congress by Paul Sarbanes and Michael Oxley when they
drafted the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act. Paul Sarbanes, a Democratic Senator from Maryland,
and Michael Oxley, a Republican House Representative from Ohio, composed the first draft of
SOX. On July 30th 2002, President George W. Bush signed the act in attempt to standardize
reporting practices of public companies and recommend guidelines for preparing financial
statements and their review. Overall, the final draft of SOX does three things: (1) describes the
new provisions that companies must adhere to while composing financial statements that focus
on prohibited auditor activities, responsibilities of executives and management controls (2)
discusses the protection of whistleblowers and (3) establishes consequences and punishments for
altered documents and the commission of fraud.
Specifically, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act establishes eight major provisions that speak to
previous grey areas in the standards, quality and ethics behind producing financial statements.
The first major provision of the Act includes the creation of a Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (Spiceland 17). This organization consists of five members and oversees the
audits of all public companies. This board ensures that the audits of public companies are
conducted according to new, strict standards designed to protect public investors’ interest. The
second provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act addresses the accountability of the corporate
executive of a company (Spiceland 17). Once the financial statements are produced to the
company’s best ability, the corporate executives of that company must sign his/her name on the
financial reports. This puts the credibility and validity of the executive in jeopardy if fraud were
to be exposed within the statements. The purpose of this is to ensure that the executives of
companies believe that the financial reports are accurate and are a fair representation of the of the
company’s financial position after considering business it has engaged in during the past month,
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quarter, or fiscal year. A third provision focuses on the performance of nonaudit services for a
company (Spiceland 17). For example, if a CPA firm performs an audit service for a company,
that same firm cannot take part in other services for the company, such as performing accounting
or consulting services for the client. The fourth provision that SOX establishes is the requirement
to retain audit paperwork for a time period of seven years (Spiceland 17). In the Enron scandal,
papers with vital information concerning the business operations were destroyed, making it
difficult for investigators to see what exactly Enron and Anderson did and where the company
went wrong while recording numerous fatal transactions.
Furthermore, the fifth provision is auditor rotation (Spiceland 17). Companies are
required to rotate audit partners every five years. The rotation of auditors helps to eliminate the
chance of fraud due to the fact that auditors cannot continuously audit the same companies for an
extended period of time. The sixth provision under SOX concentrates on conflict of interest
(Spiceland 17). This provision implies that an audit firm cannot audit a public company whose
executives have worked for the audit firm or participated in previous audits. The seventh
provision deals with the process of a company hiring an auditor (Spiceland 17). The audit firm is
hired by the board of directors audit committee of the public company and not the upper
management. The final major provision of SOX refers to the concept of internal control
(Spiceland 17). Under SOX, public companies must implement effective internal control
systems. These internal control systems should monitor cash disbursements and cash receipts
within the company the monitoring of the flow of money throughout the business.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also addresses the protection of whistleblowers of corporate
fraud cases. A whistleblower is an individual “who has and reports insider knowledge of illegal
activities occurring in an organization” (Investopedia). SOX felt the need to establish protection
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for whistleblowers under this legislation because of the retaliation a whistleblower experiences
after exposing the wrongdoings of a company. In SOX, Section 808 is dedicated to protecting
whistleblowers in corporate scandals: “No company […] may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and
conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the employee” (“The Act
Sections”). SOX allows for whistleblowers to retain their positions within the company despite
the fact that these individuals expose illegal behaviors to higher authorities. Section 808 helps to
promote fair and accurate financial reporting due to the fact that whistleblowers’ jobs are not in
jeopardy for exposing fraud or altered financial statements. While this protection exists by law, it
can be difficult to enforce in practice.
A third aspect of Sarbanes-Oxley is the punishment and consequences for creating false
financial documents, either through alteration of the financial reports or as a result of fraudulent
accounting practices. SOX defines falsification of financial reports in Section 802 when an
individual “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false
entry in any record, document, or tangible object” (“The Act Sections”). Furthermore, the
intentions behind such activities are done in order to sabotage audit reports. The punishments
due to altering financial documents and records consist of fine, imprisonment (but for not more
than 20 years), or a combination of both (“The Act Sections”). Similarly, Section 807 discusses
the penalties associated with intentional fraud within financial statements. For example, fraud
occurs when an individual “knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice to
defraud any person in connection with any security of an issuer with a class of securities” or
“[…] to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any
money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any security of an issuer with a
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class of securities” (“The Act Sections”). When an individual commits any fraudulent act, he/she
is subject to a fine, imprisonment (but not more than 25 years), or a combination of both (“The
Act Sections”).
Individuals involved with the American economy view the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as one of
the most sweeping financial reforms since the Securities Act of 1934. In a July 2002 New York
Times article about politicians’ thoughts on the SOX Act, Bumiller discusses the opinions of
President Bush. Despite the fact that Bush signed SOX into law, he was originally opposed to the
major provisions brought forth by the act (Bumiller). However, Bush’s view on the subject
changed after the second wave of scandals, when he realized that legal action was necessary to
address the amount of fraud present in financial reports for public companies. Prior to Bush
signing the act, he was criticized for his slow response time to these pressing accounting matters.
Bush describes SOX as revolutionary when he says that it will raise reporting standards and put
an end to inaccurate profits (Bumiller). Bush also addresses the punishments established by
SOX; violators pay the price of their crime under this legislation.
After Bush’s announcement to the public concerning the signing of SOX, many were
skeptical about the success the bill would have in the future. For example, shortly after Bush
announced the new act, the Democrats criticized it saying, “the new law was a good first step but
that it hardly went far enough” (Bumiller). There were still controversial aspects that were left
out of the final draft that also have substantial impacts on financial reporting, such as audit firm
rotation, audit firm credibility, and aggressive attitudes of top management. In the same article,
Harvey L. Pitt, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, agrees with the Democrats
when he says that it is a good preliminary action, but implementation will be different because
“[politicians have] got [their] hands full” (Bumiller). This preliminary action is a step towards
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reestablishing the confidence of accurate financial reports that existed before the several fraud
cases. Many deemed the implementation of SOX into public companies a challenge since it
aimed to drastically improve financial reporting, something that had not been done since the
Securities Act of 1934.
The authors of the act, Senator of Maryland Paul Sarbanes and House Representative of
Ohio Michael Oxley, were also hesitant with publishing SOX from the beginning. An article in
The Economist suggests that Sarbanes and Oxley both feel that the Act should have been written
differently and elaborated upon more of the financial reporting characteristics that played
integral parts in both waves of the accounting scandals. Furthermore, Sarbanes adds that the
context in which the Act was written offered an obstacle due to the immediate demand for a
reform in financial reporting regulations (“Five Years under the Thumb”). This pressure justifies
the haste with which Sarbanes and Oxley drafted the legislation. The pressure created from the
several scandals caused for immediate action, inhibiting Sarbanes and Oxley from addressing
some of the more complex and controversial issues in regards to the financial statements of
public companies.
Outside of Congress, the initial responses focused on the impact SOX would have on the
price of compliance and the stock market of America. The same article in The Economist
mentioned above discusses the cost aspect of Section 404 due to the fact that implementation
expenses tremendously exceeded the original predicted amounts (Five Years under the Thumb).
Furthermore, according to The Economist, others claimed SOX would weaken the American
stock market. American firms would finance through private buyers and foreign firms would
begin to sell shares elsewhere as a result of implementing SOX (“Five Years under the Thumb”).
Financing through private buyers would weaken the stock market because American firms would
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no longer be selling shares; therefore, the control of the companies would be in the hands of
those private buyers instead of the stockholders. American firms would stop selling shares due to
the fear of possibly misrepresenting the financial positions of the public companies. Many
economists, along with others, had reasonable fears with the initial establishment of SOX that
were both confirmed and refuted as implementation of the act played out in the American
economy.
The results of implementing SOX have been controversial due to the varying opinions
concerning the integration of the legislation into the American economy. Many researchers and
individuals of American businesses and firms have commented on the several controversial
aspects of SOX, which include the cost-effectiveness of adhering to the laws put forth by the act,
the protection of whistleblowers in accounting fraud scandals, and the intangible benefits
associated with the overall effectiveness of SOX in solving the problems it was originally
intended to. There have been numerous studies conducted in order to explore the price tag that
comes with complying to the Sarbanes-Oxley.
Since many companies incurred substantial compliance fees shortly after SOX came into
existence, studies of corporate governance practices were conducted to offer insight into how
SOX had affected public companies. For example, Thomas A. Hemphill, a professor in the
School of Management at the University of Michigan-Flint, published an article in 2005
discussing the impact of SOX on directors and CEOs of public companies. The survey from
2005 includes responses from the top 2,000 public traded companies and found that 23% of
companies incurred compliance costs between $1 and 5 million, 29% between $6 and 10 million
and 47% incurred more than $10 million (Hemphill). In prior years, only 22% of companies had
compliance costs of more than $10 million (Hemphill), suggesting that as time went on, the costs

10

of compliance to SOX regulations increased. This article indicates that the increase in costs were
the result of an augmentation in internal audit resources. The results of the surveys conducted
also indicated that 77% of directors and CEOs believe that SOX should be revisited by
lawmakers (Hemphill). The fact that an overwhelming number of corporate companies feel that
SOX could be improved upon sheds light on the dynamic aspect of this piece of legislation.
Although it initially addressed a portion of the problems in financial reporting for public
companies, there are still parts of the area that remain unregulated by legislation.
Although the majority of companies incurred compliance costs in respect to Section 404,
many studies have been conducted to specifically look at how the smaller companies have been
affected by regulation. Robert Benoit, President of Lord & Benoit, a SOX Research and
Compliance firm, investigated the actual costs for smaller companies to comply with regulations
set forth by the SEC and PCAOB. In The Sarbanes-Oxley Investment: A Section 404 Cost Study
for Smaller Public Companies, Benoit concluded that compliance costs were anywhere from
between $15,000 to $162,000 for Section 404(a) Management Assessment (Benoit). Benoit also
examined costs of Section 404(b) Auditor Attestations and found that audit fees increased
between $7,517 and $86,417 (Benoit). This study concludes that the costs incurred were lower
than those predicted for these small companies by the SEC in the beginning, which suggests that
Section 404 has been cost effective for both small and large companies.
Furthermore, Ivy Zhang, an academic from William E. Simon Graduate School of
Business Administration at the University of Minnesota, explores the costs of SOX in a study
titled Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In this experiment, she
indicates that some decrease in share prices in the American stock market are a result of the
provisions established from Sarbanes-Oxley. Zhang’s study concludes that the costs of the SOX
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Act exceeded the benefits from adhering to the act by the astronomical amount of $1.4 trillion
(Zhang). Although the goal of SOX was to restore investor confidence in public companies and
stimulate the stock market, this study suggests that it had the opposite effect. This number
sparked much debate about the actual cost-effectiveness of SOX because the results of this study
suggest that the stock market incurred detrimental losses after implementing this act.
On the other hand, there are researchers who feel that implementing this financial reform
act is a cost-effective action. For example, Julia Hanna published an article in Forbes discussing
this controversial aspect of SOX. Hanna concludes that the institutions, like the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, and the provisions of the act itself have not been detrimental to the
survival of businesses and firms (Hanna). Hanna suggests that since no companies have shut
down operations completely since implementing SOX, the additional fees can be considered an
initial investment for a company, and a one-time cost. Once the company incurs the costs
associated with SOX at the beginning, the firm will not have to pay them again if the methods
instituted in response to the act are successful.
Additionally, a survey was conducted in 2012 by the Financial Executives Research
Foundation that asked FEI members about costs incurred due to compliance with Section 404 of
the SOX Act. According to the survey, when asked if the company experienced an increase or
decrease of internal costs within the past three years, 29% reported an increase while 48%
reported a decrease (Sweeney). The results of this study demonstrate that costs for a greater
number of businesses of complying with Section 404 have decreased recently, suggesting that
companies are not suffering cost-wise as much as initially. Companies that experienced an
increase attributed it to the large acquisitions and additional systems for internal control, as well
as new Information Technology to enhance these additional systems (Sweeney). Firms that

12

experienced a decrease listed automated controls and reconfiguring the business and financial
systems as possible reasons (Sweeney). Also, the survey indicates that 51% companies
experienced better internal control after complying with Section 404 and felt that it was worth
the added expense (Sweeney). In conclusion, the cost-effectiveness aspect of SOX has affected
companies differently as time has progressed after passing the legislation.
Another portion of Sarbanes-Oxley that is under constant examination is the protection of
whistleblowers in accounting fraud scandals. Luigi Zingales, a professor of Entrepreneurship and
Finance from the University of Chicago, supports the provisions set forth by SOX. Zingales,
along with Alexander Dyck and Adair Morse, examine the concept of whistleblowing in their
paper titled “Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?” throughout 230 corporate fraud cases
during an eight year time period between 1996 and 2004. Before the SOX Act was implemented,
one-third of corporate accounting scandals had whistleblowers that were responsible for finding
fraud, which includes individuals like auditors and industry regulators (Zingales, Dyck &
Morse). After integrating SOX into the business practice, the number of frauds reported by
individuals responsible for finding errors and misrepresentation rose to 50% (Zingales, et. al).
This study suggests that SOX enhanced the protection of whistleblowers in corporate scandals
since more individuals were not afraid and were less hesitant to report inaccuracies while
examining financial reports.
Conversely, others feel that SOX did not have a substantial effect on the protection of
whistleblowers. For example, Richard Moberly discusses the ambiguous protection for this
unique group of individuals in his article Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Don’t Win.
Moberly states in his examination of SOX that the protections offered to whistleblowers are too
broad (Moberly). Moberly also identifies the protection aspect as “burdensome” (Moberly n.p.)
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to employers due to the fact that they must not consider whistleblowing an offense in which the
employee can be fired (Moberly). The unspecific protection provisions open doors to the
possibility of several different interpretations of the same concept, which can potentially result in
disagreement on the subject. Furthermore, other researchers have found that the success of
whistleblowing in corporate fraud has decreased after implementing SOX from 20.7% to 15.6%
(“Five Years under the Thumb”). Despite the fact that whistleblowers are offered protection
under this legislation and the number of cases brought to court has increased, it does not
automatically result in a successful trial when the fraud case is brought to court.
Finally, academics have conducted studies concerning the intangible benefits for
businesses and firms that are related to the implementation of the SOX Act. Ganesh M. Pandit,
Vijaya Subrahmanyam and Grace M. Conway published a study that focused on the audit reports
of companies listed on the NYSE before and after the SOX Act. The results of the study indicate
three areas of improvement in regards to the representation in audit reports that include: an
accurate identification of financial experts on an audit committee; a detailed report of auditor
independence; and disclosure of the preapproval of nonaudit services (Pandit, Subrahmanyam &
Conway). These improvements are important for the fair representation of financial positions of
companies; the implementation of SOX has resulted in this positive tangible benefit that will
help restore investor’s confidence in financial reporting. Another individual who explores the
intangible benefits of the SOX Act is Suraj Srinivasan, an associate professor at Harvard. She
states that information provided in financial reports will be used in more efficient ways and the
internal control systems for companies have become more efficient as well (Hanna). The
adherence to SOX is improving the quality of financial reports, which directly affects the
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accuracy of information available to individuals outside of the public companies in the American
economy.
In conclusion, the members of the accounting field, as well as those involved with
American businesses on a variety of levels have differing opinions about the implementation of
Sarbanes-Oxley. Many scholars have also published articles and studies concerning what will
happen next in regards to laws about financial reporting. For example, Michael M. MacQueen
published a study in 2010 called “Holes in our SOX: Improving the Effectiveness of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002”. This study explored several possibilities to revise SOX on account
of controversies that existed. MacQueen looked for current holes in this Act, which he identified
as internal control, or compliance with Section 404, and the control of audit committees and the
board of directors during the auditing process (MacQueen). Through this study, MacQueen
decides that the importance of the recommendations he offers is immaterial, and the possibility
of implementation is unlikely (MacQueen). Eight years after SOX was established, many
accountants and scholars began focusing on ways to improve the provisions brought forth rather
than critiquing the existing provisions. Despite the fact that MacQueen’s study concludes that
there is a poor possibility of revision of SOX to this extent, it represents a new perspective in
examining the aftermath of SOX. This study, along with the other studies mentioned previously,
demonstrate the controversy and uncertainty associated with SOX and its future benefits. After
all, SOX is only 14 years old; many times, the full effects of legislations are not apparent until
years after implementation. Was the SOX Act based on fundamental economic and accounting
ideals that will no longer pertain to future situations with financial reporting?
Many consider the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to be one of the most sweeping financial reforms
since the establishment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that addresses exchanges of
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stocks, bonds and debentures. Sarbanes-Oxley was passed in order to attempt to eliminate
financial alteration and fraud in financial statements. However, SOX is still a young act with
many long-term effects of implementation that are still unknown. With this, many accountants
and audit firms describe SOX as a work in progress.
Therefore, this paper focuses on three aspects of financial reporting that SOX fails to
address that are vital to fair and accurate financial reporting. One important aspect that plays an
integral part in financial reporting is audit partner rotation. SOX specifically mentions a
provision that requires audit partner rotation, suggesting that a company may use an audit firm
infinitely as long as the partners conducting the audit rotate every five years. A second essential
aspect that SOX fails to address is audit firm credibility. There is a provision in SOX that
requires the CEO and CFO to sign off to certify that the financial statements produced are an
accurate representation of the company’s financial position. However, a problem concerning
audit firm credibility surfaces because no single name of individual partners appear on the audit
report to certify that the audit conducted has been done so in a manner that follows audit
standards. A third but not final aspect that does not appear in SOX is corporate culture through
tone at the top. The culture fostered by upper management affects the financial statements. An
aggressive, number-driven upper management will go to lengths to make sure that the financial
position of the company is reported at what management desires it to be rather than what it
actually is. Although it is difficult to audit such an intangible area of the business, upper
management is often able to demonstrate culture through strategies like codes of conduct and
role modeling in order to display the importance of certain concepts like honesty and integrity
within the company.
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Although these three ideas were not part of SOX initially, there is a possibility that they
can be included in this dynamic piece of legislation later on. However, why were these potential
provisions not included in SOX since the beginning? Would including these provisions improve
the act and make it more effective in increasing the quality of the financial statements of public
companies? The answers to these questions provide insight into grey areas and controversial
concepts of financial reporting.
Audit Firm Rotation
In order to understand the concept and significance of audit firm rotation, it is necessary
to distinguish the idea from audit partner rotation. Mandatory partner rotation is one of the eight
major provisions brought forth by SOX. As stated before, companies are required to rotate audit
partners every five years to help eliminate the chance of employees or top management
committing fraud. Audit partners are the employees of audit firms in charge of conducting the
audit. Currently, a company may have the same public firm audit the financial statements
infinitely, as long as the partners change every five years. However, lawmakers and those
involved in public accounting have debated over the idea of mandating audit firm rotation. This
entails alternating audit firms entirely after a designated number of years instead of partners
within the same audit firm.
Audit firm rotation is a controversial idea with many supporting and opposing arguments.
Over the years, many politicians and economists have suggested and fought for the concept of
audit firm rotation in order to solidify the importance of independence when conducting an audit.
According to a review of audit firm rotation published by Corinna Ewelt-Knauer, Anna Gold and
Christiane Pott, one major argument in favor of mandating audit firm rotation is to increase
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independence in fact (Ewelt-Knauer, Gold & Pott). Independence in fact is one part of the
overall concept of independence and is a mental attitude. The auditors on the engagement must
be in a position to mentally conduct a credible and honest audit. Furthermore, auditors are not
independent in fact if they overlook or ignore accounting methods that are not acceptable under
the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). If audit firm rotation increases
independence in fact, the quality of audits will increase since auditors will have no personal ties
to the company under audit review; therefore, if the financials of the company are not accurate,
the auditor will theoretically be more likely to point out the inaccuracies instead of letting them
go unacknowledged.
Similarly, Ewelt-Knauer, Gold and Pott also believe that audit firm rotation will increase
independence in appearance. Although this is solely based on perceptions, it is just as important
as remaining independent in fact. Financial statement users, such as current and potential
investors, rely on the concept of independence in appearance. An audit that is independent in
appearance assures these investors that the financial statements are an accurate representation of
the company that they are currently or will be investing in. The review states that “financial
statement users will perceive the auditor to be more independent after mandatory rotation, which
will benefit perceptions of the financial statement and market reactions as a whole” (EweltKnauer, et. all). With mandatory audit firm rotation, financial statements will be more credible
due to the fact that the auditors are more independent in appearance. The market will trust the
initial numbers brought forth in the audited financial statements as well. If auditors are required
to rotate after a certain time period, there will be no long-term relationships between the audit
firm and client. Short relationships that are strictly for audit or other services will decrease the
chance of an auditor overlooking material mistakes within the financial statements.
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A third benefit of audit rotation is the resulting increase in market competition. Since
audit firms and clients will not be able to form long-term relationships, clients will be looking for
new firms to audit their financial statements while audit firms will be looking for new clients to
replace old ones. While audit firms will constantly be looking for new clients, rotations will be
used for “negotiating lower average costs per hour of audit work” (Ewelt-Knauer, et. all). The
corresponding risk of “cutting corners” to decreases costs includes conducting a rushed audit due
to lack of resources or time, which may lead to the release of an incorrect audit opinion. In order
to attract new clients for business, audit firms will need to lower their costs for performing
audits; therefore, audit firms will begin competing more for new clients. There will also be an
increase in market competition due to the fact that smaller audit firms will have a better chance
against the bigger public firms. Clients will likely consider more firms under mandatory audit
firm rotation, increasing the chance that smaller firms will become an option for audit firms if
the firm has the resources available.
Although there are benefits under mandatory audit firm rotation, many accountants have
eagerly rejected the idea. One of the main arguments against the idea of mandatory audit firm
rotation is that it fosters a working relationship between the audit firm and client. It is possible
that mandatory audit firm rotation would cause auditors to “be more lenient toward management
and less critical of practices of the client” (Ewelt-Knauer, et. all). If auditors are more lenient
toward management, the credibility of the audit is sacrificed. The high start-up costs for an audit
need to be recovered by the audit firm. If an audit firm publishes a modified or adverse opinion,
the client will not be pleased with the results of the audit report. Therefore, it is important that
auditors maintain the same level of professional skepticism and conduct the audit with constant
integrity, regardless of whether or not the firm recovers the start-up costs for new clients.
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A second reason that many public accountants oppose the idea of audit firm rotation is
that accountants on the audit teams are not able to develop extensive knowledge of their clients.
Extensive knowledge of clients being audited is a major asset in respect to the accuracy and
efficiency of the audit. Furthermore, the review indicates that “audit failures most likely occur in
the early years of engagement, which could be explained by a lack of expertise on the side of the
auditor” (Ewelt-Knauer, et. all). This is an important argument because audits that fail are similar
to audits that are not independent. If audit firms are required to rotate after a designated time
period, a new audit firm will be conducting an audit with limited knowledge and experience
within the company. Continuing audit engagements permit the expansion of an auditor’s
knowledge regarding a specific client. This knowledge is the result of a long relationship,
something that will not happen if audit firms are required to rotate. Auditors are able to become
thoroughly familiar with their clients, allowing them to perform an accurate and more efficient
audit than a firm that must learn about the industry and client’s business prior to completing the
audit.
A third but not final argument against mandatory audit firm rotation is the market
concentration that would result from such rotation. Although there is the possibility that smaller
firms might be given a chance to gain more audit clients, there is also the possibility that larger
corporations will alternate between the Big 4 firms (Ewelt-Knauer, et. all). The Big 4 are
attractive options for audit firms because clients admire the vast “resources and expertise to deal
with frequent rotations and hence a great variety in complexity of clients” (Ewelt-Knauer, et.
all). If smaller firms are completely eliminated as options for conducting the annual audits for
the larger corporations, it is possible that the audit engagement will be passed around between
the Big 4 firms after the time limit approaches. Market competition is not healthy in this sense
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because a majority of the audits would be conducted by the same four companies. Although this
type of market concentration exists to an extent because of the vast resources that each of the Big
4 firms has available, mandatory firm rotation would further inhibit the opportunities for smaller
firms to gain new clients.
Due to the fact that there are many benefits and consequences of audit firm rotation, there
is a mixture of countries who require some extent of audit firm rotation and others that have
abolished it entirely. A Wall Street Journal article written by Emily Chasan titled “European
Parliament Approves Mandatory Auditor Rotation” discusses the recent change in requirements
in one of the largest and most developed economic regions. The new stipulation requires certain
companies, including European-listed companies, banks and financial institutions, to rotate audit
firms every 10 years. In addition to the mandatory firm rotation, tighter restrictions will be
placed on certain consulting services and “cap the amount of additional fees auditors can charge
their clients” (Chasan). These additional fees are incurred through other services that accounting
firms provide for their clients along with the audit. The limitations imposed upon the consulting
services and additional fees are another attempt to increase auditor independence. Many times,
independence is diminished through the relationships that clients have while an audit
engagement is not happening. Furthermore, a restriction in additional audit fees caters to the idea
of lower costs incurred by clients. It is hoped that rotating auditors after a 10 year period will
decrease the financial burden that clients experience while trying to find a new audit firm
because of the increase in market competition.
Chasan’s article also offers insight into the international effect of making audit firm
rotation mandatory in Europe. The article states that “U.S. banks that operate subsidiaries in
Europe would be impacted, and it could lead to broader changes in the international market for
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audit services” (Chasan). Although audit firm rotation has not been established in the United
States yet, some subsidiaries of U.S. companies are now affected by it. The new law is
expanding the number of companies being exposed to audit firm rotation. Like Chasan writes, it
could influence more companies with subsidiaries or other financial connections in Europe to
accept and implement mandatory audit firm rotation. This is a progressive step in accounting
requirements. Ed Nusbaum, the chief executive of Grant Thornton International, acknowledges
the idea that audit firm rotation was not even a question in the previous decade. The concept of
audit firm rotation is controversial yet dynamic since more countries are bringing the notion to
the table.
Another economically developed country which requires audit firm rotation is China.
However, China is different than many other countries when it comes to mandating audit firm
rotation because the country has created its own policy in which financial institutions and stateowned enterprises must rotate every three years. Furthermore, in other industries, an auditor
cannot engage with the same client for more than five consecutive years. Sally Percy’s article
“China’s audit rotation” published in Economia explores reasons as to why China has eagerly
adopted the idea of audit firm rotation. In the article, James Lee, a regional director of Greater
China for the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) believes that
haste in which the country established audit firm rotation is a method to “improve audit
governance, allowing time for the profession to mature” (Percy). According to the article, the
accounting profession in China is in its early stages. The notion of audit firm rotation improves
the credibility of the audit engagement due to the fact that it is an extra precaution to ensure the
audit firm remains independent from the client.
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Percy’s article continues with an examination of audit firm rotation in practice. Another
reason why China follows mandatory firm rotation is to “loosen the stranglehold of the Big Four
accountancy firms on the large audit market in the country” (Percy). As stated previously, one of
the arguments opposing audit firm rotation is that it will result in market concentration. So far,
the article describes the dominance of the Big Four that still exists: “Despite local firms being
invited to tender for the audits of three of China’s largest banks in 2012, the Big Four ended up
swapping among themselves” (Percy). This demonstrates one of the problems with audit firm
rotation. The Big Four firms are attractive audit firms for companies, both domestically and
internationally; therefore, although companies are complying with the mandatory firm rotation
provision, only a certain number of audit firms are being considered. Smaller Chinese public
accounting firms are not able to audit many companies due to the dominant presence of market
concentration in the audit market.
Although there are some economically successful countries that practice mandatory audit
firm rotation, a majority of countries do not. One country that opposes the idea of firm rotation is
Canada. The Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) published a statement on its view of
mandatory rotation that explains why it has yet to be established in Canada. For reasons similar
to arguments mentioned before, Canada does not participate in firm rotation because it would
“result in a lengthy procurement exercise, diverting resources from audit quality – leading to a
‘race to the bottom’ on audit fees” (Mandatory Rotation and Tendering). CPAB feels that
rotating audit firms after a designated time period would be an inefficient practice. Many times,
audit firms are able to conduct high quality audits due to the client-specific knowledge fostered
from a long term relationship. If the auditors are forced to rotate, the new audit firm will spend
valuable time and resources familiarizing itself with the client whereas a repeat audit firm can
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conduct the audit immediately and with more knowledge. Furthermore, CPAB believes that
mandatory firm rotation will lead to a “race to the bottom” in regards to audit fees. Firm rotation
would result in an increase in competition between audit firms since they would need to
continuously find new clients. In order to make themselves look more attractive, audit firms
would lower audit fees associated with the engagements. As mentioned before, lower audit fees
lead to the corresponding risk of lower quality audits.
After examining a combination of countries that participate in and oppose audit firm
rotation, it is clear that this idea is still controversial with diverse practices across borders. The
countries that switch to required firm rotation all have different experiences. For those under the
rule of the European Parliament and China, the unique policies concerning audit rotation are
setting examples and giving other countries insight into what switching to mandatory rotation
would entail. Others, like Canada, are not fond of the idea because of the damage it might do to
the quality of the audit engagements. The controversial views on audit firm rotation shed light on
why it was not included in the initial draft of SOX in 2002. However, the wave of countries
introducing audit firm rotation as time progress alludes to the fact that the debate is far from
over.
Audit Firm Credibility
The idea of audit firm credibility is another critical aspect of financial reporting that SOX
fails to address. As stated before, one of the major provisions established by SOX focuses on the
accountability of upper management producing financial statements for a public company.
Specifically, the corporate executive of the company must sign his/her name on the financial
reports. The signature attests that the financial statements have been accurately and honestly
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produced to the best of upper management’s knowledge and ability. This provision of SOX puts
the credibility of the executive signing off on the statements in jeopardy if fraud were to be
uncovered later on during an audit.
Although corporate executives are personally responsible for signing off on the financial
statements produced for the company, the accounting firms that audit the same statements do not
release individual names when signing off on the audit report. This concept does put the audit
firm’s reputation in jeopardy in case the audit fails, but the names of the audit partners are
protected on the audit reports unlike members of upper management. Therefore, SOX creates a
gap between the credibility of corporate executives of public companies and audit firm partners.
Although the financial statements are the responsibility of management and the accounting firm
is a second set of eyes, it is important to stress audit firm credibility as well. The goal of an audit
is to ensure that the financial statements are a credible and accurate representation of the
financial position of the company. Furthermore, an accounting firm with numerous audit
engagements also adds to the credibility of the firm. Constant audit engagements build the
reputation of the firm, increasing the overall credibility.
The reputation of corporations and audit firms is a dynamic topic that SOX fails to
address due to the fact that the importance of reputation has changed throughout history.
Jonathan R. Macey discusses the shift in the importance of reputation in his book The Death of
Corporate Reputation: How Integrity has been destroyed on Wall Street. In Macey’s
introduction, he proposes three plausible reasons for a decline in the importance of reputation:
(1) individuals involved in the financial industry focus more on their personal reputation instead
of their employer’s reputation, (2) participants in the financial markets rely on law and regulation
for protection rather than reputation as a whole and (3) the world of finance becomes more
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complex as time progresses, which has replaced the historical idea of simple reputation (Macey
1-2). The significance of reputation has diminished because the priorities of participants in
financial markets have also shifted. According to Macey, the financial industry has morphed into
aggressive individuals more concerned with their personal reputations rather than the success of
the company.
Macey begins his explanation of how reputation has changed by establishing what
reputation has meant throughout history. Macey begins with the “old economic model of
reputation”, an idea where “firms invest in reputation so that customers will do business with
them” (Macey 8). In prior years, building a reputation became an important investment for firms
due to the fact that a good reputation would attract business and reliable customers. According to
Macey, customers valued a firm with a respectable reputation and trusted that the company
would conduct business operations in an honest manner. Furthermore, Macey concludes that
reputation is an investment for firms through a cost-benefit analysis. A credible and honest
reputation will “attract customers who will pay a premium to deal with the company with the
good reputation” (Macey 8). The willingness of the customers to pay a premium keeps daily
business operations going and contributes to the long-term success of the firm.
Unfortunately, there has been a decrease in the importance that corporations place on a
credible reputation. In the current economy and financial markets, Macey argues that the costs of
being honest are far more than those to be dishonest (Macey 10). Firms are no longer willing to
invest in a good reputation because of the high costs. In upper management’s opinion, there are
more important assets for the company to invest in that will generate higher profits instead longterm customer trust. For example, Phil McKinney published an article in Forbes titled “The
Real Reason to Invest in Technology” that implies that one major capital budgeting expense that
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many companies incur is technological advancement. McKinney identifies the top three reasons
why companies are putting their funds toward technology instead of building a reputation:
progress—anytime and anywhere, a sense of security, and the need for speed (McKinney). These
three benefits of investing in technology allow for business operations to continue uninterrupted
and free of security breaches because members of companies can fulfill their responsibilities at
any time of day from any location. This article represents the mindset of many firms today
because firms are focused on working effectively and efficiently rather than honestly and in ways
that build reputation.
The Enron and Arthur Andersen scandal is a noteworthy example of how reputation
throughout the accounting industry has diminished. Prior to taking on Enron as a client, Arthur
Andersen and Co. emphasized independence and credibility when it came to performing audits
and providing other consulting services to its clients. Before Enron’s collapse, “none of its
clients, including Enron, accounted for more than 1% of Andersen’s United States auditing
revenue” (Macey 130). Because of this small percentage of revenue, it appears that Andersen did
not have such a significant financial interest in Enron as a whole. Andersen had a combination of
other large clients that kept the accounting firm afloat with a credible and reliable reputation. In
1914, Andersen strived to be the auditor that investors trusted to verify the accuracy of the
financial statements of public companies. However, the golden reputation slowly diminished as
time progressed while individual reputation took precedence over firm reputation as a whole.
The reputation of Andersen began to decline as its relationship with Enron became more
complicated. The team of auditors assigned to Enron led by David Duncan shifted its priorities
when it came to the audit engagement. Macey describes this group of auditors as “loyal to the
client and not to the firm” (Macey 132). The relationship between Enron and Andersen revolved
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around the reputation of the individuals on the audit team and not the overall reputation of
Andersen as an accounting firm. Duncan and his team members prided themselves on the
contract with Enron because of the numerous benefits associated with it.

The auditors

deliberately ignored the aggressive accounting methods of Enron in order to ensure that this
relationship continued.
When the auditors continuously overlooked the methods that made Enron’s financial
statements grossly inaccurate, Andersen’s credibility and reputation as an accounting firm was
destroyed. A credible reputation for accounting firms is crucial because otherwise, “the auditor’s
verification function loses its value” (Macey 128). Without a reputable firm conducting an audit
engagement, the audit opinion on the financial statements is less likely to be trusted by outside
parties, especially current and potential future investors. Therefore, audit firms should spend
years building up a credible reputation through issuing high-quality audits of financial
statements. Although SOX attempts to strengthen audit firm independence by imposing
restrictions on the extent of relationships that can exist between audit firms and their clients,
SOX fails to directly address the importance of a credible reputation.
Another instance throughout history that illustrated the decline of audit firm credibility
was the collaboration between Lehman Brothers and one of the Big 4 accounting firms, Ernst &
Young. A Wall Street Journal article titled “Ernst Accused of Lehman Whitewash – New York
Sues the Accounting Firm, Alleging a 7-Year Fraud as It Made $150 Million in Fees” discusses
the scandal in which Ernst helped Lehman Brother’s hide its actual financial condition. The
scheme revolved around Repo 105, a method “used to shift the assets off Lehman’s books in
return for a promise to buy back the securities at a premium days later” (Rappaport & Rapoport).
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The cash generated from these transactions was used to decrease liabilities on the balance sheet,
making Lehman Brothers appear to be in a better financial position that it really was.
Rappaport and Rappaport’s article explains that the series of Repo 105 transactions sheds
light on the close relationship between the accounting firm and its client. The relationship
between Lehman and Ernst sacrificed independence due to the employment history of
Christopher O’Meara and David Goldfarb. O’Meara, a former partner at Ernst, held the title of
chief financial officer (CFO) from 2004 to 2007 of Lehman after heading the risk management
division (Rappaport, et. all). In 1994, O’Meara joined the company while it was still a client of
Ernst. Goldfarb followed in O’Meara’s footsteps, holding the CFO position of Lehman after
serving “as a senior partner at Ernst’s Financial Services practice” (Rappaport, et. all). Since
O’Meara and Goldfarb held such high and important positions in both Ernst and Lehman, they
were not fully independent during the seven year scheme.
This conflict of interest fostered the working relationship between Lehman and Ernst.
The article states that according to securities filings, “Ernst earned more than $185 million in
audit and other fees” prior to the bankruptcy of Lehman (Rappaport, et. all). This astronomical
number for Ernst’s revenue from Lehman alone sheds light on the fact that Ernst was willing to
sacrifice its independence in return for money and a continuous working relationship with such a
big client. This case supports the idea that accounting firms are more concerned with pleasing
their clients instead of offering a credible opinion on the published set of financial statements.
Lehman Brothers sought help from its audit firm for additional financial services that allowed
them to disguise its true financial condition during the seven years. Ernst was no longer
concerned with the firm’s reputation that should portray independence and credibility, an action
that destroys the original intention of conducting an audit.
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A third accounting scandal that emphasizes the lack of audit firm credibility is the
HealthSouth fraud. HealthSouth was considered to be one of the largest rehabilitation hospital
operators in the United States. In 2004, HealthSouth was investigated by the SEC for overstating
revenue by $2.5 billion since 1999 (Washingtonpost.com staff). The investigation revealed that
the accounting methods of HealthSouth’s capitalizing and expensing certain costs were what
caused the company to overstate its profits by such an astronomical amount. The notion of audit
firm credibility comes into question with Ernst & Young, HealthSouth’s audit firm.
According to a Wall Street Journal article, several red flags were brought to Ernst’s
attention during the audits but the accounting firm was not able to detect the scheme in place on
HealthSouth’s books. One major red flag from the audits was when William Curtis Miller, a
partner at Ernst, “testified that the firm took no action when told that HealthSouth’s internal
auditor was denied access to key HealthSouth books” (Mollenkamp & Carrns). Furthermore, the
audit firm received specific information concerning possible fraudulent activity in three
accounts, but James Lamphron, another Ernst partner, stated that the auditors “‘[…] found
nothing that was inappropriate’” (Mollenkamp, et. all). Despite actions that imposed scope
limitations for the audit and tips from employees at HealthSouth, Ernst was unable to find the
fraudulent activity and issued incorrect audit opinions over a period of time. When the
HealthSouth scandal surfaced, the company fired Ernst as its audit firm. According to the most
recent proxy at the time of the scandal, the company “paid the accounting firm $3.6 million for
its 2001 financial-statement audit and related services” (Mollenkamp, et. all). HealthSouth paid a
substantial amount of money in audit and related fees to receive a credible opinion from the
auditors. Unfortunately, at the expense of HealthSouth, Ernst & Young’s reputation and

30

credibility suffered with the inability to spot a multi-billion dollar fraud although the firm still
continues on as one of the most prestigious public accounting firms!
Therefore, the problem of audit firm credibility exists because of the change in values in
the accounting industry. The importance of conducting a quality audit has diminished due to the
fact that “people are no longer embarrassed to be sued the way they used to be. It is just a cost of
doing business” (Macey 23). Macey alludes to the notion that people no longer take pride in their
work when doing it the first time. If an unqualified audit opinion is issued for financial
statements containing fraud, it is likely that the company which produced the financial
statements along with the auditors who examined them will get sued. In prior years, being sued
for providing an incorrect audit opinion was embarrassing because auditors were supposed to
verify the statements. Now, with legal action being “a cost of doing business,” people assume
that audits may be conducted incorrectly, which defeats the original intention of conducting an
audit.
The number of accounting scandals that have surfaced since the establishment of SOX
shows that audit firm credibility and reputation is still a problem in the public sector. As shown
with the Enron scandal, audit partners, like David Duncan, are more concerned with keeping
their client satisfied to ensure that the relationship persists and the accounting firm stills earns
revenue from the audit engagements. Furthermore, the scandals involving Ernst & Young are an
example of when an audit firm fails to remain independent and is unable to assure the public of
the accuracy of financial statements. Independence and credible financial statements are the two
main products that audit firms have to “sell” to acquire and keep clients. When audit firms are
not able to do this, the reputation of the accounting industry and profession as a whole begins to
crumble. Furthermore, the fact that these audit firms are still considered to be the most
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“prestigious” in the industry diminishes credibility further because the firms are not able to fulfill
their fiduciary duties and responsibilities that accompany their titles. In order to help restore
investor confidence, the importance of audit firm credibility must be reestablished first.
Tone at the Top
The concept of tone at the top is a third and crucial area necessary for accurate financial
reporting that SOX fails to adequately address. The concept of tone at the top was discussed in
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s (COSO) Internal
Control-Integrated Framework. This framework consists of five components and 17 principles
that play an essential role in effective internal controls. These five components of the COSO
framework are the control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and
communication, and monitoring activities. Although each of the five elements is important for
evaluating the effectiveness of an organization’s internal controls, the control environment
addresses the honesty and integrity of the upper management, in other words tone at the top.
The control environment has five related principles that demonstrate the aspects of tone
at the top that SOX fails to address. Sara Lord’s An Overview of COSO’s 2013 Internal ControlIntegrated Framework lists the principles of the control environment as the following: the
organization demonstrates a commitment to integrity and ethical values; the board of directors
demonstrates independence from management and exercises oversight of the development and
performance of internal control; management establishes, with broad oversight, structures,
reporting lines, and appropriate authorities and responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives; the
organization demonstrates a commitment to attract, develop, and retain competent individuals in
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alignment with objectives; and the organization holds individuals accountable for their internal
control responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives (Lord).
Furthermore, Lord indicates that the points of focus for the control environment
emphasize the corporate governance aspect of the organization. Overall, the five principles
related to control environment set the tone at the top, establish the structure of the business in
regards to oversight and reporting, establish the policies and procedures, and finally, enforce
accountability through performance measures like rewards and disciplines (Lord). Based on
these principles of the control environment, tone at the top is reflected in the board of directors’
and upper management’s attitudes towards the role that honesty and integrity play in conducting
daily business operations. These ethics and values filter into the production of the financial
statements and are directly related to the accuracy and honesty of these statements.
The first draft of SOX incorporates several aspects of tone at the top. For example,
publicly traded companies must have an audit committee as a part of its board of directors. The
audit committee must be composed of independent individuals outside of the company, and one
of these individuals must be a financial expert. A publication from Gelman, Rosenberg &
Freedman titled Audit Committees: The Roles and Responsibilities discusses the role of the audit
committee as the following: “The primary purpose of an audit committee is to provide oversight
of the financial reporting process, the audit process, the system of internal controls and
compliance with laws and regulations” (Audit Committees: The Roles and Responsibilities). The
role and requirement for the audit committee is an important aspect of tone at the top because
this group of executives is highly involved with the financial statements. If the Audit Committee
is not independent from top management, conflicts of interests may arise, which may skew the
reporting process or result in an audit that is not independent.
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Another important aspect of tone at the top that SOX included is the requirement of a
code of ethics. Section 406 of SOX defines a code of ethics as “standards necessary to promote
(1) honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of
interest between personal and professional relationships and (2) full, fair, accurate, timely, and
understandable disclosure in the periodic reports required to be filed by the issuer; and (3)
compliance with applicable governmental rules and regulations” (Sarbanes Oxley Act Section
406). Furthermore, the senior financial officers should disclose the existence of the code of ethics
and reasons as to why or why not there has been a code adopted. This is also an important part of
tone at the top because a code of ethics is a direct reflection of the values and ethical standards of
upper management. Public companies governed by senior financial executives with strong senses
of morality and integrity hold the accuracy of the financial statements to high importance,
reducing the likelihood of fraudulent reporting.
One example of how the tone at the top of an organization can be reflected in the
financial statements is by the phenomenon of earnings management. Earnings management is “a
strategy used by management of a company to deliberately manipulate the company’s earnings
so that the figures match a predetermined target” (Investopedia). Often, upper management will
manipulate earnings numbers in both directions to stay on track with predictions from outside
parties. Top management will either increase or decrease earnings through several accounting
practices, some of which often fall within the range of generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) and some of which may violate GAAP. Although the accounting practices fall within
GAAP, some accountants feel that the methods are too aggressive to represent the actual
financial position of the company, creating an illusion for current and potential investors.
Organizations that engage in earnings management exhibit a tone at the top that is more
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concerned with pleasing investors and meeting predictions than revealing their actual financial
condition.
In addition, tone at the top is one of the major factors that contributed to the downfall of
Enron. According to a CNN summary of the scandal, “Enron shares were worth $90.75 at their
peak in August 2000,” (Enron Fast Facts) prior to the sale of these shares by top management.
The price of the shares plummeted to $0.67 a share in January of 2002 after the company
“announced massive losses, slashed shareholder equity by $1.2 billion and came under intense
pressure from investors” (The Associated Press). Enron found itself in this scandal because of
aggressive, self-serving and sometimes improper accounting practices that top management
executives accepted and encouraged.
Gregory J Millman’s article “New scandals, old lessons: Financial ethics after Enron”
discusses two critical business orthodoxies that shed light on Enron’s tone at the top. The first is
that managers should have the mindset of shareholders. Millman’s article quotes Lynn SharpPaine, a Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School: “‘Enron shows the
dangers or risks involved in trying to align everybody’s financial interest’” (Millman). Professor
Sharp-Paine explains that the various groups financially involved with Enron created the
obsession with the company’s financial success. The different groups, such as the managers,
investors, legal and financial advisors and accountants, were all under the pressure of stock
prices, a direct reflection of Enron’s projected and perceived financial position.
The second business orthodox in which Enron’s tone at the top failed was that managers
should also have the mindset of entrepreneurs. Millman’s article explains the problems
associated with Enron’s slogan, which included “that everybody was always to ask ‘why’”
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(Millman). This slogan often prompted executives to ask “why not?” regarding important
business decisions. Enron emerged as an energy commodity that sold natural gas and electricity.
As Enron grew and became a leader in its industry, the company turned itself into an investment
fund, offering investment instruments like stocks and bonds. Enron employees sold these
derivatives with little knowledge and experience, fostering an aggressive entrepreneurial image.
With this aggressive and care-free attitude, it is easier for executives to seek opportunities that
others have overlooked. However, this creates a problem because entrepreneurs can sometimes
be too aggressive as a result of confidence, sending the company into unknown territories of
business. Enron’s upper management became entrepreneurs but failed as it could not keep up
with the changing business operations.
The combination of the previously mentioned business orthodoxies along with a lack of a
company code of ethics or conduct emphasizes the importance of tone at the top when producing
financial statements. Millman’s article further explains that Enron did, in fact, have a code of
ethics but it was ineffective because it did not “address what happens when the core business is
under attack” (Millman). Once Enron felt that pressure of the stock prices, the company began
to crumble and upper management disregarded the existing code of ethics. The tone at the top of
Enron changed when conflicts of interest arose, causing the executives to overturn the policies
during high-pressure times.
Another example of financial statement fraud in which tone at the top had a significant
influence was the WorldCom scandal in 2001. An article published by the Association of
Certified Fraud Examiners explains management’s role in preventing fraud in the workplace
using a WorldCom employee as an example. Walt Pavlo was the Senior Manager in Billing
Collections for the company and his primary responsibilities including customer payments,
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credits and account reconciliations (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners). Pavlo became a
victim of upper management pressure when he felt the need “to constantly achieve revenue
growth in the company” (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners). WorldCom was a company
full of executives driven by numbers and would do anything to achieve that. An article published
in the Los Angeles Times titled “WorldCom Execs’ Conduct Detailed” discusses Bernard Ebbers’
attitude towards a corporate code of conduct: “The report stung Ebbers for resisting efforts to
establish a code of conduct at WorldCom. Ebbers was said to have described it as a ‘colossal
waste of time’” (Barakat). Ebbers’ lack of desire to establish such a code of conduct indicates
that WorldCom’s tone at the top did not value honest financial statements and pressured Pavlo
and other employees to follow suit.
As a result of WorldCom’s demanding and crooked tone at the top, Pavlo began to
manipulate numbers on his own discretion. Through various meetings with superiors and
colleagues, Pavlo learned to hide uncollectible debt. Concealing uncollectible debt increases a
company’s assets and profits because there is a higher net receivable and lower bad debt
expense. Pavlo’s actions display the importance of tone at the top because “he felt that he was
doing his job and making his employers happy by altering the company’s financial data”
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners). WorldCom’s tone at the top tricked its employees
into thinking that altering the financial position of the company was acceptable despite the fact
that it was not the truth.
The collapse of Enron and WorldCom are examples that illustrate how essential a proper
tone at the top is for the survival of a company. The tone at the top of a company demonstrates
what the organization values and how it carries on conducting business. The values and ethics
brought forth by an organization’s tone at the top directly affect the financial statements. The
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strong connection between tone at the top and accurate financial statements is something that
SOX fails to address. This also sheds light on the fact that upper management also affects
financial statement credibility through the culture that the executives create in the workplace.
Conclusion
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 took the financial reporting world by storm in an
attempt to restore investor confidence in the financial statements of publicly traded companies.
Although this piece of legislation addressed problem areas such as audit partner rotation and the
protection of whistleblowers, the ideas of audit firm rotation, audit firm credibility and tone at
the top were excluded. After an examination of these three concepts, one can conclude that these
ideas are also essential to restore investor confidence in financial statements and should be
considered in the future.
The initial reactions to this sweeping financial reform indicated that SOX was a short
term response to an important problem in financial reporting. Therefore, one future reform that
should be implemented is audit firm rotation. Although there are several costs associated with
this idea, the benefit of increasing independence outweighs such costs. Independence is crucial to
the success of an audit and restoring investor confidence in the audited statements. Lawmakers
can use other countries that engage in audit firm rotation as an example when implementing the
rotation of audit firms. To alleviate some of the burden of costs associated with starting up a new
auditor-client relationship, audit firms should rotate after a period of five years. Five years is a
time period in which firms will not feel like they are constantly switching clients but will still be
able to remain independent. The audit firms will be able to enjoy some of the benefits of no audit
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firm rotation, such as being able to gain client-specific knowledge without jeopardizing the
independence of the audit through a historical relationship.
Another area that should be incorporated in SOX in the future is audit firm credibility. As
stated before, the decline in importance of audit firm credibility diminishes the foundation of the
accounting profession as a whole. In order to restore the original importance of audit firm
credibility, audit firms should be punished for actions that sacrifice factors of credibility. For
example, audit firms that collaborate with the upper management of a client in a fraudulent
scheme should be suspended from practicing for a designated time period and such should be
strictly enforced by the SEC and PCAOB. Suspension would help to emphasize the importance
of credibility again. An authority should be able to decide the exact details of punishment,
depending on each situation. The threat of punishment would help restore firm credibility
because of the consequences it would have on the success of the firm.
Finally, tone at the top should be monitored to an extent because of the correlation
between the company’s values and the accuracy of its financial statements. Although tone at the
top is company-specific, there are factors present throughout all companies that influence upper
management’s tone. For example, an authority can implement a provision that builds upon
Section 406 of SOX that would require all companies to have a code of conduct that addresses
certain areas. Although a code of conduct is necessary to portray the company’s attitudes and
values, there is no regulation as to how in-depth the code of conduct needs to be. An authority
should establish certain topics and areas in which companies should focus their codes of conduct
on. Furthermore, there should be punishment for not implementing and following the code of
conduct. Following the code of conduct is more important because it shows that the company is
conducting business in an ethical and appropriate manner. In addition to the code of conduct,
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companies may offer annual seminars to remind employees of the details of the code of conduct.
Other activities that foster an anti-fraud environment include anti-fraud training programs. If
organizations are required to participate in a certain number of activities to establish a more
ethical tone at the top, companies may feel less pressure to engage in fraudulent reporting. There
will also be more equality among organizations and the economy as a whole. A second way that
tone at the top can be positively affected throughout all companies is through a stronger presence
of outside independent directors. For example, the audit committee must be composed of such
outside and independent directors, including one financial expert. However, stricter requirements
can be established in order to ensure that the directors chosen are actually independent from the
company and have no other financial interest in the performance of the company. Therefore,
these three areas address the fact that accurate financial reporting is two-sided. Although the
audit firm’s primary responsibility is to provide credibility to a set of financial statements, upper
management of a company also has a responsibility to produce accurate financial statements to
the best of their ability and knowledge.
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